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Abstract 
Since Kyoto Protocol is going to be expired in 2012, all the develop ed and developing countries are very concerned 
about the future of clean development mechanism. By using the game theory the paper analyzes the market of clean 
development mechanism, especially the projects of CDM between the U.S., EU, Japan and China. Based on this, the 
prospects of Chinese CDM market are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
In December 1997, in Kyoto, Japan, the United Nations Climate Conference adopted the Kyoto Protocol. 
But due to various reasons, the agreement was formally  established on February 16, 2005.The Kyoto 
Protocol requires that from 2008 to 2012 all developed countries should reduced 5.2% o f greenhouse gas 
emissions compared to that of 1990. The developing countries including China and India have no 
obligation to reduce emissions, and can set the targets of reducing emissions voluntarily. Based on this, 
the Kyoto Protocol incorporates three co-reduction mechanism as International Emissions Trading (IET), 
Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)˷˹.  
CDM allows the developed countries to invest emission reduction projects in  the developing countries. 
Through the project the developed countries can get emission reduction credits by Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs), thus offset its domestic emission reduction obligations. The CDM is widely  accepted 
and used in the international community as co-operation mechanisms between the developed and 
developing countries, because it has win-win effect. For the developed countries, the CDM brings a more 
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cost-effective emission reduction programs. For the developing countries, the effective application of the 
CDM can provide financial and technical support to sustainable development. 
In 2009, the first phase of the Kyoto Protocol expired, so the 15th Meeting of the Patties of United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was the 5th Conference of the Parties of the 
Kyoto Protocol, was held on December in Copenhagen Denmark.  Representatives from 192 countries 
discussed the global emissions reduction agreement from 2012 to 2020. However, Copenhagen Protocol, 
which has legal obligation to  member nations failed after two weeks of d ifficu lt negotiations. The United 
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon promised to promote the agreement. While, if the Copenhagen 
Protocol can not be agreed when the first commitment period of Kyoto Protocol expired in 2012, there 
will be no common documents to restrict global greenhouse gas emissions. Whether this would affect the 
future of the CDM or not becomes a big concern. China has invested a lot  on the CDM projects, so it 
cared more about its development. 
2. The prospect of the CDM market in Post-Kyoto-Era 
2.1.  The pressure of public opinion around the world 
Although Kyoto Protocol came into being under the background of global protection of environment, 
with different round of meet ings, the problems member countries are facing is not only the reduction of 
the emissions of the greenhouse gases, but also political and economic issues: In Copenhagen, the 
attitudes of individual countries vary due to various reasons.  
The United States concluded that the target of reduction of 4% is difficult to  be promised. 
EU promised to reduce 95% by 2050. Europe tried to re-establish its international leadership in the 
issue of climate change and said that if the agreement on climate change can be achieved in  the 
Copenhagen Summit, European countries would reduce 95% of the greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 
and reduce 30% by 2020. 
The president of Russia announced that the greenhouse gas emissions in Russia would decrease 25% 
by 2010. 
Ramesh, the Indian environment min ister said, by 2020 India will cut down the carbon dioxide 
emissions of per GDP of 20%-25% based on that of 2005. 
In Copenhagen, the EU and other countries are more positive than the United States. 
After the meeting in Copenhagen, Japanese House of Representatives adopted the Climate Warming 
Countermeasures Basic Act on May 14, 2010. The Act requires that Japan should cut down 25% of the 
reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions  based on that of 1990; by 2050, down of 80%. And the carbon 
emissions trading mechanism would be set up with the environmental taxes. The Act mentioned that the 
proposition of reduction of 25% is that all major countries should agree on the international framework 
for climate change with fairness and effectiveness and establish a positive emission reduction target˷˹
Now, as the world power, the EU, Japan and Russia have put forward their own emission reduction 
targets, which will push the United States. In order to maintain the world power status, the United States 
now is wait ing and seeing, but because of public pressure from home and abroad, if it continues to ignore 
its responsibilities as the major power, its status and prestige will be affected in the following 
international summit. Therefore, the United States is bound to some reduction targets. 
2.2. The analysis of the behavior of American commitment on emission reduction targets based on game 
theory 
According to Climate Warming Countermeasures Basic Act, the proposition of reduction of 25% is that 
all major countries should agree on the international framework for climate change and establish a 
656  Zhang Jun and Niu Jiaoxu / Energy Procedia 5 (2011) 654–658
positive emission reduction target. And EU promised that if the agreement on climate change can be 
achieved in the Copenhagen Summit, European countries would reduce 95% of the greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050 and reduce 30% by 2020. That is, whether the EU and Japan continue the 
implementation of relevant greenhouse gas emission reduction program is closely relate d to the 
possibility of reaching a worldwide agreement on climate change. The commitment of the second period 
of Kyoto Protocol is closely related with the attitude of the United States. The paper use the Cournot 
Model and Stackelberg model to analyze the situation of the commitment to reduce emissions among 
Europe, Japan and the U.S. before and after Copenhagen. 
The European Union and Japan know that the United States will take their future emission reductions 
as given. Thus, the EU and Japan (Stackelberg  leaders) have a strategic advantage to the United States 
(Stackelberg follower). The EU and Japan can adjust their emission reduction and have influence on the 
behaviour of the United States. At the same time, in choosing their own level of emissions reductions, the 
EU and Japan will take into account the emission reduction effects on the behavio ur of the United States. 
Because if the EU and Japan take the initiat ive to undertake the emission reductions which is consistent 
with their national status, the United States has to undertake a certain  emission reduction commitments in 
the future conference due to its super power in the world. Otherwise, the U.S. will be condemned by other 
nations. On the other hand, the United States takes the emission reduction of the EU and Japan as given. 
So response curve of the U.S. is: 12 bqaq       0,0 !! ba                                                            ˄1˅ 
The response curve of the EU and Japan is: 21 dqcq       0,0 !! dc                                        ˄2˅ 
 In the equation, 
2q is the quantity of the emission reduction commitment of the U.S., 1q  is the quantity 
of the emission reduction commitments of the EU and Japan. From equation (1), the relat ionship between 
the United States and EU, Japan about emission reduction commitment is monotonically decreasing. That 
is, if the EU and Japan propose a high level of emission reductions, the commitment of the United States 
level of reduction will naturally be less, because it can have a free ride, namely, the U.S. can enjoy the 
benefits of environmental change without its own emission reduction commitments. On the contrary, this 
can also apply to the European Union and Japan. The specific value of dcba ,,,  can be put aside here. 
Before the Copenhagen Meeting, the United States and EU, Japan do not know the commitments of 
other countries, which  is consistent with the case of Cournot model. The equilibrium solution is the 
intersection of the two response curves. The equilibrium solution can be calculated. 
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However, after the Copenhagen Meeting, the United States can be sure that the EU will reduce 30% by 
2020 and 25% of Japan. A lthough in Copenhagen the United States can not guarantee the commitment of 
4%, it needs to commit in the future conference of the Parties of Kyoto Protocol. This is consistent with 
Stackelberg model. 
Because the EU and Japan are Stackelberg leaders, more emission reduction is with less utility. The 
utility function of them can be assumed as:   2exxU   0,0 ! xe                                                    (5)  
Introducing the equation (2) into the utility function:     221 dqceqU                                      (6)  
Let Max{    221 dqceqU   }  ..ts .0,0 21 tt qq                                                                       (7)                     
The equilib rium solution can be calculated: 
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 Form equation (9), the change of American emission reductions in the Stackelberg model and the 
Cournot model is related to b and d . b is the degree of American response to the European and Japanese 
emission reductions. d  is the degree of European and Japanese response to the American emission 
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reductions. From the reality, the countries will consider the situation in other countries when dev eloping 
their own greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments, so 1!bd . Thus  
02
/
2 ! qq                                                                                                                                  (10) 
That is, 2
/
2 qq !                                                                                                                                 (11) 
So the equilibrium point will no longer be the intersection of the response curve (1) and (2), but higher 
than that in Cournot model. 
The reason is the EU and Japan will no longer take the American  emission reductions as given. On  the 
contrary, the EU and Japan realize that the level of American emission reductions would depend on the 
level of their own. This makes the United States increase the level o f emission reductions which is h igher 
than the level in the Cournot model. By manipulating the emission reductions of the Stackelberg fo llower, 
the Stackelberg leader can improve its overall level of utility. 
 It is reality  of the EU and Japan. They have developed a corresponding reduction targets, hoping to 
indirectly manipulate and promote the American decision by their own choice. Under pressure of public 
opinions and from the perspective of its own  utility, the United States had to play  the ro le of Stackelberg 
follower. In other words, in the future conference of the Parties of Kyoto Protocol, the United States will 
take the corresponding responsibility, and the emission reduction commitments are gradually increasing.  
3. The impact of the prospects of the CDM in China 
3.1. The huge potential market of Chinese CDM projects: the United States 
Although the attitude of the United States in Copenhagen is not positive, and it thinks it is difficu lt to 
promise the reduction target of 4%, the House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (ACESA) by 219 to 212 votes on June 26, 2009. The Act can only be in effect by the 
majority of the 60% Senate and signed by president Obama, but the app roval by the House of 
Representatives is a big progress. The Act sets a legally b inding and gradually decline the constraint on 
the total amount of American large greenhouse gas emission sources, such as power plants, 
manufacturing  facilities and o il refineries, which need to reduce 25% by 2020 based on that of 2005, and 
83% by 2050. 
When the Act is in effect, 80% of industries in  the U.S. will be covered, including almost all of the 
electricity power companies and the major industrial enterprises whose annual carbon dioxide emissions 
are more than 25,000 tons. Since the technology of emission reduction in the U.S. is advanced than many 
developing countries, according to the law of dimin ishing marginal utility, it may  cost a lot to achieve the 
emission reduction targets under the Act in the U.S. The CDM with the great advantage of the cost of its 
emission reduction can provide low-cost and standard performing assets for the U.S. to complete the 
emission control tasks. In the near future, the U.S. is likely to become a huge potential market  of Chinese 
CDM projects. 
3.2. The main markets of Chinese CDM projects: the EU and Japan 
In China, the EU member countries, and Japan are the main driv ing force of the current CDM market. 
Till August 31, 2010, the projects approved by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) are 2640. The specific countries of the foreign partners are as the following. 
Table 1Foreign Partners of Chinese CDM Projects 
State Approved by NDRC Registered by executive council CERs being issued  
E.U. 746 362 133 
Japan 169 71 16 
Swiss Confederation 68 13 1 
Canada 1 1 1 
658  Zhang Jun and Niu Jiaoxu / Energy Procedia 5 (2011) 654–658
Kingdom of Norway 13 0 0 
Source: http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/web/item_new.asp?ColumnId=62 
From table 1, we can see that most of the Chinese CDM projects are cooperated with the EU, then 
Japan.The EU launched Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) officially, on January 1, 2005, which 
covered all the 27 EU member states and non-member countries such as Swiss Confederation and 
Kingdom of Norway, with the objectives and functions of the reduction of the carbon dioxide emissions. 
On November 14, 2004, the EU allowed the members of EU ETS to use the CDM pro ject CERs to offset 
their emissions from 2005, so as to achieve the connecting of the EU ETS and the CDM. To cooperate 
with the EU ETS, and actively carry out the activities of greenhouse gas emission reduction, the EU 
regulates that the enterprise will be punished by a fine of 40 euro if the carbon dioxide emission s is over 1 
ton, since 2005. Since 2008, it increased to 100 euro per ton, and in the fo llowing year, the corresponding 
quantity should be deducted from the amount of the permitted emission. 
The markets of EU and Japan are the powerful backing force to ens ure the existence of the CDM 
market  in  China. The EU ETS, the relevant provisions of the EU, and the Basic Act  on Climate Warming 
Countermeasures of Japan ensured the stability of the market. 
4. Conclusion 
Although the Kyoto Protocol is going to be expired in 2012, also the CDM, and it is very difficu lt for 
the negotiation of second commitment period, a lot of human resource and capital have been input to 
provide the basic conditions of project implementation, such as the research of methodology. So it is 
impossible to cancel the CDM. 
The United States thinks it is not possible to achieve the emission reduction commitments of 4% in  
Copenhagen, but the attitude of other powers counter and the public opinion will push the U.S. to 
undertake the corresponding emiss ion reductions. From the analysis, based on game theory, the United 
States will be more proactive in the future conference of Kyoto Protocol and the reduction commitments 
are bound to rise. All these indicate the survival of CDM . Therefore, when the ACESA takes effect, the 
United States will become the potential customer of Chinese CDM market. 
 The main markets of Chinese CDM pro jects are the EU and Japan, and the regional ETS of these 
countries support the development of international greenhouse gas emissions market. So the Chinese 
CDM will certain ly play a b ig ro le in this market, by the advantages of relatively low costs. Therefore, the 
CDM project will not be affected too much, no matter whether the results of the negotiations of the future 
conference of Kyoto Protocol are.  
It is not possible to cancel the CDM, but in the future the provisions of Kyoto Protocol may be more 
stringent. Probably, the developing countries will be required to have a certain commitment to emission 
reductions. In response to this change, the NDRC also reserves resources, for the market of domestic 
buyers. Form the prospect of the marg inal ut ility of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, China still has 
considerable space of reduction. Thus, the CDM projects should be actively prepared. 
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